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Abstract 
Background: procrastination refers to the delay or postponement of task or decision-
making initiation or completion and is often conceptualised as a failure of self-
regulation. Recent research has suggested that metacognitions play a role in 
procrastination and that unintentional procrastination (UP), as opposed to intentional 
procrastination (IP), may be the most problematic form of this behaviour. We aimed to 
test a metacognitive model of procrastination that was grounded in the Self-Regulatory 
Executive Function model. Methods: a convenience sample of 400 participants were 
recruited and completed (at least partially) a battery of online questionnaires that 
measured IP and UP, metacognitions about procrastination, depression, and Cognitive 
Attentional Syndrome (CAS) configurations. Initially, we tested series of hypotheses to 
                                                        
 Compliance with Ethical Standards. All authors declare that they have no 
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later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Informed consent was obtained 
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establish the relationships between the experimental variables and to test whether CAS 
configurations would independently predict UP when controlling for age, depression, 
IP, metacognitions about procrastination, and whether an individual reported that they 
had been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder. Results: CAS configurations, 
depression, and metacognitions independently predicted UP. Additionally, path 
analysis revealed that the study data was an excellent fit to the proposed metacognitive 
model of procrastination. Limitations: the study is cross-sectional. Conclusions: the 
metacognitive model of procrastination presented in this paper can be used to generate 
novel interventions to treat this problematic behaviour. 
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Introduction 
Procrastination 
Most of us can recall a time in our lives when we have procrastinated, perhaps because 
it is a nuanced concept that appears to be understood differently by different 
individuals. Broadly speaking, the term ‘procrastination’ seems to be commonly used 
to refer to an episode when an individual is ‘putting off’ or failing to complete an 
activity (such as doing homework or filing a tax return) in any given moment. 
Procrastination is a common behaviour, with the prevalence rates reported as high as 
70% in students (Ellis & Knaus, 1977) and 20% in an adult sample (Harriott & Ferrari, 
1996). Perhaps unsurprisingly, it has been found to be associated with diminished 
academic and work performance, as well as poor mental health (Stöber & Joormann, 
2001). 
Some psychologists have conceptualised procrastination as a failure of self-
regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994), in 
other words a maladaptive attempt to manage behaviour or emotion. Some individuals 
may believe that by postponing a task they will perform better (and successfully) at a 
later date, however it is unlikely that this strategy consistently results in a successful 
outcome (e.g., students submit assignments late, people fail to return their tax returns 
on time, etc.). For this study, we define procrastination as the postponement or 
avoidance of starting, engaging in, and/or completing a task or a decision-making 
process, whether intentional or unintentional (Fernie, McKenzie, Nikčević, Caselli, & 
Spada, 2015). 
Conceptualizations and Models of Procrastination 
Several different conceptualizations and models of procrastination have been proposed 
in the extant psychological literature. For example, behaviourists have utilised operant 
conditioning to understand procrastination. This approach recruits avoidance behaviour 
in the role of a maintaining factor for procrastination (Ferrari & Emmons, 1995). 
Procrastination is reinforced because exposure to aversive stimuli (e.g., writing 
challenging essays, cleaning filthy toilets, etc.) is avoided. This perspective has been 
criticized for failing to account for individual differences amongst procrastinators 
(Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995). From a more cognitive perspective, much like 
Baumeister et al. (1994), Tuckman and Sexton (1989) also conceptualized 
procrastination as a failure to self-regulate. In a similar manner, Ellis and Knaus (1977) 
also postulated that procrastination was an illogical and non-goal directed behaviour but 
emphasized the key role of irrational cognitions. Central to this Rationale-Emotive 
Therapy perspective are the presence of two irrational beliefs: firstly, procrastinators 
doubt their ability to complete a task and, secondly, they fear the possible negative 
social consequences of failing to complete a task well. Further studies suggested that 
particular cognitive constructs are implicated in procrastination. For example, the 
perceived difficulty of a particular task (i.e., its level of ‘task aversiveness’) has been 
shown to be associated with procrastination (Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), as well as 
self-efficacy beliefs (Haycock, McCarthy, & Skay, 1998), self-esteem (Ferrari, 1994), 
and perfectionism (Stöber & Joormann, 2001). 
 Later still, Steel and König (2006) presented a model of procrastination they 
called Temporal Motivation Theory (TMT) in an attempt to synthesize several strands 
of research. TMT can be represented by an equation that aims to calculate the perceived 
utility ascribed to the initiation of, engagement with, and/or the completion of, a task, 
arguing that this is a function of the likelihood that an individual will procrastinate in a 
given situation.  In calculating perceived utility, TMT employs several variables, 
specifically: valence (i.e., the ‘amount’ of attraction or aversion an individual feels 
towards the task – its level of task aversiveness), expectancy (i.e., a measure of how 
likely an individual believes that a given task will yield utility), delay (i.e., the length of 
time before the individual will experience the expected outcome), and gratification (i.e., 
an individual’s intolerance of the delay). Arguably all of these variables tap in to 
several cognitive constructs that have been implicated in procrastination, namely task 
aversion, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and perfectionism. However, TMT (alongside other 
traditional CBT conceptualizations of procrastination that tend to emphasize the role of 
the content of cognitions) appears to neglect the possible key role of cognitive 
processes and attentional strategies in this behaviour. 
Metacognitions, the Self-Regulatory Executive Function model, and 
Procrastination 
The concept of metacognitions refers to a higher-order thinking that embodies beliefs 
concerning cognitive processes, attentional strategies, behaviours, and physical 
sensations. Metacognitions play a central role in the Self-Regulatory Executive 
Function (S-REF: Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996) model of psychiatric disorders. 
The S-REF model describes a cognitive architecture, consisting of three interacting 
levels that are delineated into an automatic, low-level (or bottom-up) component, an 
online stage that reflects conscious cognitive processes and attentional strategies, and 
a higher-level that represents long-term memory and is where, according to the 
model, metacognitive beliefs (or metacognitions) are stored. In clinical practice, when 
working from a Metacognitive Therapy (MCT: Wells, 2011) perspective that was 
built from the S-REF model, psychiatric disorders and emotional distress are 
formulated using the Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS) as a framework. The 
CAS consists of cognitive processes (such as distraction, rumination, and worry), 
maladaptive behaviours (e.g., avoidance), and attentional strategies (for example, self-
focussed attention) that are governed by metacognitive beliefs (e.g., “My rumination 
is uncontrollable” and “My worry keeps me safe”). According to MCT, psychiatric 
disorder and emotional distress are the consequences of particular CAS configurations 
that result in ‘perseveration’: i.e., sustained engagement in unhelpful processes, which 
themselves represent self-regulation strategies that fail to modify maladaptive self-
knowledge and behaviour.  Problematic CAS configurations can be characterized by a 
particular relationship that individuals have with their thoughts, such that they are 
treated as facts that represent an objective reality (in the terms of the S-REF model, 
this is labelled ‘object-mode’) rather than mere transient mental events that are 
separate from the self and the world (termed ‘metacognitive-mode’); in this mode, 
thoughts are a form of potentially inaccurate representations that provide but a 
shadowy impression of reality (Wells, 2011). 
Intentional and Unintentional Procrastination 
More recently, procrastination has been delineated into intentional and unintentional 
domains (Fernie, Bharucha, Nikcevic, & Spada, 2016). Intentional procrastination (IP) 
refers to the deliberate and conscious engagement in this behaviour, while unintentional 
procrastination (UP) pertains to situations where it is perceived as involuntary. UP, but 
not IP, has been shown to be associated with low mood and anxiety (Fernie et al., 
2016). The construct of IP aligns itself with the development of a self-report measure 
called the Active Procrastination Scale (APS; Choi & Moran, 2009) and, of particular 
relevance to this study, a sub-factor within the APS named ‘Intentional Decision to 
Procrastinate’. A brief self-report measure of UP has also recently been developed and 
validated, namely the Unintentional Procrastination Scale (UPS: Fernie et al., 2016). 
Chu and Choi (2005) proposed that there are two types of procrastinator: 
passive and active. They characterized a passive procrastinator in a manner that alludes 
to more ‘traditional’ conceptualizations of this behaviour. Passive procrastinators 
typically leave tasks to the last minute despite their good intentions, attenuating 
performance. Active procrastinators choose to delay task initiation or completion, 
believing that this strategy may actually optimize performance. This delineation 
between active and passive procrastinators is similar to the distinction between IP and 
UP. However, in this paper, we test a model of procrastination in which problematic 
procrastinators engage in both IP and UP due to presence of metacognitions that 
activate maladaptive cognitive processes, such as distraction, rumination, and worry. 
We argue and test in this paper the hypothesis that cognitive or ‘ego’ depletion 
(Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) is key to 
understanding UP. We propose that when engaging in IP, a problematic procrastinator 
initiates a particular CAS configuration, consisting of distraction, rumination, and 
worry, in a futile attempt to regulate their behaviour. As a result, UP becomes 
unavoidable and perseverative because these cognitive processes and attentional 
strategies consume significant mental resources and are inefficient means to achieve 
specific goals or complete required activities. Consequently, the problematic 
procrastinator has insufficient mental resources to allocate to task initiation and/or 
completion, in other words they begin UP. Furthermore, engagement in rumination and 
worry have been shown to result in negative affect (Berenbaum, Bredemeier, 
Thompson, & Boden, 2012; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2009), a 
consequence of which may be a lethargy that may further contribute to attenuated 
performance. The use of distraction is also likely to be unhelpful. This attentional 
strategy would result in the misallocation of the remnants of mental resources away 
from task initiation and/or completion, deleteriously affecting performance.  
Metacognitions and Procrastination 
General metacognitions, measured using the Metacognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-
30: Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), have been 
found to be significant predictors of both decisional and behavioural procrastination 
(Spada, Hiou, & Nikcevic, 2006). Later still, metacognitions specific to procrastination 
(Fernie & Spada, 2008) have been shown to be significant predictors of, again, both 
decisional and behavioural procrastination (Fernie, Spada, Nikčević, Georgiou, & 
Moneta, 2009). Furthermore, three impaired factors of attentional control (focusing, 
shifting, and flexible control of thoughts), as well as two general metacognitive factors 
(negative beliefs concerning thoughts about uncontrollability and danger and lack of 
cognitive confidence), were found to be significantly and positively associated with 
decisional procrastination (Fernie et al., 2015). In line with the S-REF model and 
supported by earlier research (Fernie et al., 2016), we propose that IP is, to some extent, 
a voluntary strategy aimed at self-regulation that is fuelled by metacognitions. Research 
has shown that positive metacognitions about procrastination (e.g., “When I 
procrastinate, I am unconsciously mulling over difficult decisions”) were more strongly 
associated with IP than negative metacognitions about procrastination (e.g., “My 
procrastination is uncontrollable”) when controlling for negative affect, while the 
relative strengths of these relationships were inverted when the bivariate associations 
between metacognitions and UP were examined (Fernie et al., 2016). 
Study Aims and Hypotheses 
Our first aim was to test several hypotheses to provide further evidence for the 
proposed metacognitive model of procrastination. These were that: (1) positive 
metacognitions about procrastination will be positively associated with both IP and UP 
(this would replicate the findings of an earlier study: Fernie et al., 2016); (2) levels of 
depression would be significantly associated with UP, maladaptive CAS 
configurations, and negative metacognitions about procrastination; (3) problematic 
CAS configurations, consisting of distraction, rumination, and worry result in cognitive 
depletion and therefore should be significantly and positively correlated with UP; and 
(4) CAS configurations of this type will predict significant additional variance in UP 
when controlling for negative affect, as well as other variables that have been found to 
be associated with the dependent variable.  
By testing these hypotheses, and collating our findings with those from earlier 
research that investigated the role of metacognitions in procrastination, we would then 
be able to address the primary aim of this study: i.e., to use path analysis to test a 
metacognitive model of procrastination. In this model, positive metacognitions about 
procrastination activate IP and then, if problematic CAS configurations are brought 
online (fuelled by negative metacognitions about procrastination), this will result in 
negative affect, before leading to UP. 
Methods 
Participants 
A convenience sample of 400 (309 females; mean age = 30.9 years; SD = 12.6; range 
18 to 72 years) participants was recruited for this study, via a university research 
volunteer email circular and social media, and completed a battery of online 
questionnaires, but only 305 participants completed all measures. This means that 
nearly a quarter of individuals who started to participate in the study did not go on to 
complete it, however this dropout rate is not unusual in web-based research (see 
Birnbaum, 2004 for a discussion of the issues associated with web-based research). 
Eligibility criteria required that participants: (1) were at least 18 years of age, (2) 
possessed adequate English language skills, and (3) consented to participate. Due to the 
significant number of international students enrolled at the university, the participants 
were from all continents, except Antarctica. However, the majority of participants 
(53.2%) reported being British or having dual citizenship (one nationality of which was 
British).  The ethnicity of the sample was reasonably diverse, although the majority of 
the participants self-identified as White (73.5%). While 20.1% of the sample reported 
their ethnicity as Asian, 2.3% described themselves as Black, 2.3% as having a mixed 
ethnicity, 0.3% stated they were Arab, and the remaining participants preferred not to 
say. We anticipated that the sample would be international and that for many of the 
participants English would not be their first language. This revealed itself to be a 
reasonable supposition, with 36.2% of the sample reporting a first language other than 
English. However, 95.7% of the participants reported that they were either ‘confident’ 
or ‘very confident’ in their ability to read English, while 94.3% rated their ability to 
write English at these same confidence levels. None of the participants reported 
inadequate English reading or writing skills. 
 We also wanted to be able to describe our sample in terms of (1) their mental 
health and (2) their exposure to psychological therapies, because this could mean that 
some participants were familiar with some of the concepts expressed by the items that 
comprise the experimental measures used in this study, potentially risking a response 
bias. Firstly, 9.3% disclosed that they had a mental health diagnosis. Of these, 73.0% 
reported that they had been diagnosed with depression and/or an anxiety disorder. 
Secondly, 24.5% of the entire sample stated that they had previous, or were currently 
engaged in, psychological therapy. Of these, 47.0% had been exposed to CBT and 
20.4% reported that their therapy was or is, at least in part, to help with problematic 
procrastination. However, perhaps in part because problematic procrastination is not a 
clinical diagnosis in either the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(Association, 2013) or the International Statistical Classification of Disease and Related 
Health Problems (Organization, 2004), we were unable to evaluate whether this 
represented an approximately equivalent rate to individuals in the wider population who 
seek help for procrastination. 
Materials 
Emotional measures 
The Patient Health Questionnaire 9 (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) was 
used to assess depressive symptoms. The PHQ-9 is a nine-item scale designed to 
measure depressive symptoms and possesses good psychometric properties, with 
respondents indicating the level they have experienced the symptoms described by the 
items (e.g., “Feeling down or depressed”) over the preceding two-weeks on a four-
point, Likert-type scale that ranges from ‘not at all’ (scoring zero) to ‘nearly all the 
time’ (scoring three). Responses to all items are summed together, meaning that higher 
scores indicate the presence of greater levels of depressive symptoms (Kroenke et al., 
2001). 
Procrastination measures 
The ‘Intentional Decision to Procrastinate’ (IDP) factor of Active Procrastination 
Scale (APS) was used as a measure of IP. The full APS consists of a total of 16-items 
equally distributed over four factors (Choi & Moran, 2009). The IDP factor contains 
items such as “I intentionally put off work to maximize my motivation” and “To use 
my time more efficiently, I deliberately postpone some tasks”. Participants are 
required to indicate the extent to which they agree with such statements on a four-
point, Likert-type scale ranging from ‘disagree’ (scoring one) to ‘agree’ (scoring 
four). The responses are summed, so that higher scores reflect greater levels of IP. 
The IDP factor of the APS has been reported to possess good validity and adequate 
internal consistency (Choi & Moran, 2009). We used the Unintentional 
Procrastination Scale (UPS: Fernie et al., 2016) to measure UP. The UPS consists of 
six-items such as “Often I mean to be doing something, but it seems that sometimes I 
just don’t get round to it” and “I really want to get things finished in time, but I rarely 
do”. Much like the IDP, participants indicate their strength of belief in the items on a 
four-point, Likert-type scale, ranging from ’do not agree’ (scoring one) to ‘agree very 
much’ (scoring four). Again responses are totalled and higher scores indicate greater 
levels of UP. The UPS possesses discriminant, construct, and concurrent validity, as 
well as good internal consistency (Fernie et al., 2016). 
Finally, we used the Metacognitions about Procrastination Scale (MaPS) as a 
measure of meta-beliefs about procrastination (Fernie et al., 2009). The MaPS consists 
of two, eight-item factors that assess positive metacognitions about procrastination 
(PMP) and negative metacognitions about procrastination (NMP). An example item of 
an item from the PMP factor is “When I procrastinate, I am unconsciously mulling over 
difficult decisions” and for the NMP factor is “My procrastination is uncontrollable”. In 
terms of concurrent validity, NMP has been shown to be significantly correlated with 
both general and decisional procrastination, but PMP is only significantly associated 
with the latter (Fernie et al., 2009). The MaPS uses the same response-format as the 
UPS. Higher scores on either factor (which are summed separately) indicate a greater 
endorsement of positive and/or negative metacognitions about procrastination. The 
factors have been shown to possess good internal consistency (Fernie et al., 2009). 
Measure of Cognitive Attentional Syndrome configurations 
Participants were asked three questions about the extent that they worry, ruminate, 
and/or try to distract themselves during an episode of procrastination. Participants were 
required to respond on five-point, Likert-type scale ranging from “I do not worry about/ 
ruminate about/ distract myself from my procrastination or I do not procrastinate” 
(scoring zero) to “I always worry about/ ruminate about/ distract myself from my 
procrastination” (scoring four). Thus higher scores suggest greater levels of worry, 
rumination, and/or distraction activated in response to an episode of procrastination. 
The responses to each question were converted to z-scores and used to calculate a mean 
measure of problematic CAS configuration activation (termed CAS mean). 
Procedure  
Potential participants were directed to the study website containing the questionnaires. 
The first two pages of this provided information regarding the purpose of the study, 
describing that responses were anonymous, and that consent would be assumed once 
participants click on the ‘submit’ button that followed the battery of questionnaires. In 
the pages following this information, participants were presented with a series of 
questions to ascertain their demographic details, their exposure to psychotherapy 
(subsequently subjected to binary coding), and their current mental wellbeing (e.g., “Do 
you have a psychiatric diagnosis?”). Participants were not required to record their 
names. Once more participants were informed that, by clicking on the submit button 
that followed the questionnaires, they were consenting to participate in the study. Prior 
to this, they were informed that once they click the submit button, it would not be 
possible to withdraw their data from the study because it was uploaded in an 
anonymous form. 
Statistical Analyses 
Firstly, the distribution of the study data was assessed for non-normality. Secondly 
statistical differences in the study variables were examined between males and females, 
those with psychiatric diagnoses, and those exposed or naïve to psychological therapy. 
Four of the experimental hypotheses were evaluated using correlational and 
hierarchical regression analyses. Finally path analysis was used to test a metacognitive 
model of procrastination that was based on earlier work by Fernie et al. (2016) and used 
UPS as the ‘end-point’ of the model because this variable has been shown to be 
strongly associated with negative affect (Fernie et al., 2016). 
Results 
Distribution of Data and Non-Parametric Difference Tests Between Demographic 
Variables 
A series of Kolmogorov–Smirnov normality tests were conducted on the data from all 
the experimental measures and these revealed that all of the variables were non-
normally distributed. As a consequence, a series of non-parametric Mann-Whitney U 
tests were conducted on the data to establish whether the gender of participants, those 
with psychiatric diagnoses, or individuals who had been exposed to psychological 
therapy differed on all experimental measures. These tests suggested that males 
significantly endorsed NMP more than females (Mann-Whitney U = 8638, n1 = 69, n2 = 
252, p < .05). They also indicated that individuals that self-reported having a 
psychiatric diagnosis had significantly higher levels of depression (Mann-Whitney U = 
2333.5, n1 = 32, n2 = 273, p < .0001), engaged in more UP (Mann-Whitney U = 2466.5, 
n1 = 32, n2 = 302, p < .0001), more strongly endorsed NMP (Mann-Whitney U = 2928, 
n1 = 32, n2 = 289, p < .01), and showed greater activation of maladaptive CAS 
configurations (Mann-Whitney U = 2560.5, n1 = 32, n2 = 274, p < .0001). This finding 
suggested the need to control for psychiatric diagnosis in the regression analysis that 
sought to test the fourth study hypothesis. Furthermore, these Mann-Whitney tests 
revealed that participants who had been exposed to psychological therapy endorsed 
NMP to a significantly less extent than those who had not (Mann-Whitney U = 8663, n1 
= 92, n2 = 229, p < .05), hinting that talking therapies directly or indirectly targeted 
these beliefs. 
Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistencies of the Study’s Experimental 
Measures, and Testing the First, Second, and Third Study Hypotheses 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alphas for all experimental 
measures. We generated Spearman’s Rho correlation analyses to explore the 
relationships between some of the participants’ demographics and the experimental 
measures (see Table 1). The UPS significantly and positively correlated with all 
variables (supporting the first, second, and third study hypotheses) except age, which 
revealed a significant and negative relationship, suggesting that people engage in less 
UP as they age. The variables that were significantly associated with UPS indicated that 
we needed to control for them in the later regression analysis that tested the fourth 
study hypothesis. 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis with UPS as the Outcome Variable to Test the 
Fourth Study Hypothesis 
The data concerning participants’ ages, as well as their scores from the IDP, the PHQ-9, 
both factors of the MaPS, their mean CAS z-scores, and whether a participant had 
received a psychiatric diagnosis were assessed for their suitability for regression 
modeling. No evidence of multicollinearity in the dataset: (1) no correlations greater 
than r = .9 were identified between the predictor variables used in the regression 
analysis, (2) the ranges of the Tolerance Index (TI) were 1.00 to 0.54 (i.e., no TIs were 
calculated below 0.20), and (3) the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all predictor 
variables were less than 10 (the highest VIF was 1.84). Additionally, the Durbin-
Watson test suggested that the assumption of independent errors is tenable. 
Furthermore, histograms and normality plots suggested that the residuals were normally 
distributed and plots of the regression-standardized residuals against the regression-
standardized predicted values provided evidence that the assumptions of linearity and 
homoscedascity were met. 
A six-step hierarchical regression analysis was conducted with UPS as the 
outcome variable (see Table 2) to test the fourth study hypothesis. Participants’ age was 
entered as a predictor on the first step, self-reported diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder 
on the second, PHQ-9 on the third, IDP on the fourth, both PMP and NMP on the fifth, 
and CAS mean on the final step. PHQ-9, PMP, NMP, and CAS mean remained 
independent, significant predictors in the final model. At any step following the first, 
participants’ age was a non-significant predictor of UPS, and at no point in the 
hierarchical regression model was current or previous exposure to psychological 
therapy an independent predictor of UP. The final model explained 37% of the variance 
in UPS scores, supporting the fourth study hypothesis. 
Path Analysis of the Metacognitive Model of Procrastination 
The primary aim of this study sought to test our proposed metacognitive model of 
procrastination (see Figure 1). We used the Lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012), running 
on the R Studio package (R-Studio, 2012), to test the pattern of relationships of our 
proposed model using path analysis (bootstrap = 1000). We were restricted to using 
scores obtained from 305 of the 400 participants because cases were excluded if any 
were missing data. Our model revealed that all estimated coefficients were significant 
at the p < 0.001 level and explained 46% of the total variance in UPS, indicating that it 
was an excellent fit of the observed data. To further evaluate the goodness of fit of the 
model, we calculated the R-Square of each endogenous variable: IDP = 13%, CAS 
mean = 40%, PHQ-9 = 16%, and UPS = 24%. Again, this suggested that our model was 
at least a good fit of the observed data. Additionally all the indirect paths were 
significant at a minimum of the 1% level (not shown in Figure 1). PMP had an indirect 
effect on CAS mean via IDP (β = .07, p < .01), IDP had an indirect effect on PHQ-9 via 
CAS mean (β = .08, p < .01), and CAS mean had an indirect effect on UPS via PHQ-9 
(β = .20, p < .001). 
Discussion 
Addressing the Aims of the Study 
The primary aim of this study was to test a metacognitive model of procrastination that 
was developed within the framework of the S-REF model and synthesized the findings 
from several studies that had implicated a role for metacognitions in this often 
problematic behaviour (Fernie et al., 2016; Fernie et al., 2015; Fernie & Spada, 2008; 
Fernie et al., 2009; Spada et al., 2006). Prior to evaluating the model, we found 
evidence to support all four of the study’s hypotheses. Firstly, PMP were significantly 
and positively associated with both IP and UP. Secondly, PHQ-9 scores were 
significantly associated with UP, maladaptive CAS configurations, and NMP, 
providing further evidence for the key roles played by the CAS and metacognitions in 
negative affect, and thus for the S-REF model. Thirdly, we found that problematic CAS 
configurations were significantly and positively correlated with UP. Fourthly, CAS 
configurations of this type predicted significant additional variance in UP when 
controlling for the participants’ ages, their current or previous exposure to 
psychological therapy, IDP, PMP, and NMP. These findings (particularly those that 
resulted from the testing of the third and fourth hypotheses) lent support to our 
contention that UP could be significantly explained by the depletion of mental 
resources that had been misallocated to problematic CAS configurations consisting of 
distraction, rumination, and worry. Indeed, earlier research had suggested that impaired 
performance is associated with such cognitive and attentional processes (see Hofmann, 
Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012 for a discussion). 
 Arguably, we found good evidence that our proposed metacognitive model of 
procrastination was, at the very least, a good fit of the data obtained by this study. Our 
model proposes that PMP lead to IP that, alone, is not necessarily harmful. However, in 
the case of problematic procrastinators, if in response to IP problematic CAS 
configurations are brought online alongside NMP (e.g., “My procrastination is 
uncontrollable”), this worsens mood and perservative UP results. This is because 
engagement in cognitive processes such as worry and rumination drains mental 
resources, reducing the ability to perform and further lowering mood. These now 
depleted mental resources not only reinforce NMP, they are also often misallocated 
through maladaptive attentional strategies (i.e., distraction) that make it even more 
difficult to initiate or complete the task at hand, further contributing to UP and low 
mood. 
 We suggest that our model has the capacity to offer a framework that can be 
used to interpret a broad range of the findings from the extant literature on 
procrastination. For example, our model clearly frames UP as a failure of self-
regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 1994; Tuckman & 
Sexton, 1989). Additionally, intuitively it seems that the depletion of mental resources 
resulting from the problematic CAS configurations, intrinsic to our model, is likely to 
increase the perceived difficulty of a task (i.e., task aversiveness: Solomon & 
Rothblum, 1984; Steel & König, 2006), worsen mood (Stöber & Joormann, 2001), and 
lead to the perseveration of UP, consequently harming self-efficacy (Haycock et al., 
1998) and self-esteem (Ferrari, 1994) beliefs. It also seems that our model would 
reinforce at least the first of the two beliefs that Ellis and Knaus (1977) argued were 
strongly endorsed by problematic procrastinators: i.e. they doubt their ability to 
complete a task. If maladaptive CAS configurations deplete mental resources, 
procrastinators will be less able to complete tasks. Furthermore, some studies have 
reported a degree of success in reducing procrastination using paradoxical techniques 
where participants were ‘allowed’ to procrastinate (e.g., Shoham-Salomon, Avner, & 
Neeman, 1989). Such an intervention may indirectly challenge NMP and reduce the 
activation of problematic CAS configurations. 
 Unlike Choi and Moran (2009)’s delineation of procrastinators into two distinct 
sub-types (i.e., active and passive) that may seem to share a conceptual overlap with the 
constructs of IP and UP, our proposed model does not see these types of behaviours as 
representing a categorical difference between individuals. Instead, our findings suggest 
that IP leads to UP via particular CAS configurations, NMP, and low mood. In fact, this 
is consistent with the correlation analyses conducted by Choi and Moran (2009) that 
found a significant and positive correlation between IDP and their measure of passive 
procrastination. 
Clinical Implications 
Studies testing the efficacy of CBT for procrastination seem sparse. Indeed, the authors 
of this study were only able to identify a few relevant published studies. Firstly, a 
proposal for a RCT that plans to compare group-delivered versus Internet-based CBT 
for procrastination (Rozental, Forsström, Nilsson, Rizzo, & Carlbring, 2014) and, 
secondly, a study that reported a case series that evaluated a brief CBT intervention in a 
small sample (n=7) utilising an uncontrolled design that reported successful outcomes 
(Karas & Spada, 2009). Thirdly, another study reported that a group CBT intervention 
was beneficial in reducing academic procrastination (Toker & Avci, 2015) whilst, 
fourthly, a study that compared Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (arguably a third 
wave competitor to MCT) to CBT suggested that both were at least mildly affective in 
reducing problematic aspects of procrastination (Wang et al., 2015) 
 However, we propose that treatments based on our model have significant 
potential. The model that we have presented in this paper is grounded in S-REF theory 
from which MCT was developed. A recent meta-analysis provided preliminary 
evidence that MCT is more effective than traditional CBT in treating anxiety and 
depression (Normann, van Emmerik, & Morina, 2014), which we suggest bodes well 
for the potential efficacy of MCT-derived interventions for problematic procrastination. 
Our model suggests several targets that could be addressed by MCT interventions. 
Firstly, PMP and NMP could be challenged using restructuring techniques or 
behavioural experiments. Secondly, the metacognitions hypothesized to govern the 
problematic CAS configuration activated in response to IP could also be targeted with 
the aim of reducing worry and rumination. Thirdly, a reduction of the use of distraction 
could be achieved by improving selective attention by using Attention Training 
Technique (Wells, 2007; Wells, White, & Carter, 1997). 
On a side note, our analyses also provided further support for the strength of the 
psychometric properties of the MaPS (Fernie et al., 2009). The PMP factor of the MaPS 
revealed ‘acceptable’, and the NMP factor ‘excellent’, internal consistency. 
Furthermore, evidence for the concurrent and discriminant validity of the MaPS was 
generated. The PMP factor was significantly associated with IDP and UPS, while the 
NMP factor was only significantly related to UPS and not IDP. 
Limitations 
This study is subject to several limitations that will have to be addressed by future 
research. First, social desirability, self-report biases, context effects, and poor recall 
may have contributed to errors in the self-report measurements. Second, a cross-
sectional design was adopted and this does not allow causal inferences. Third, this 
study utilized self-report measures to assess subjective experience and meta-awareness 
and as such, like much cognitive research, there is always doubt whether we are 
measuring the constructs we intend. Fourth, there were issues with the sample 
characteristics: the majority of participants were female, nearly three quarters identified 
themselves ethnically as ‘White’, and approximately half of the sample, in terms of 
nationality, identified as British. This impacts on our ability to generalize these findings 
to other ethnicities and nationalities, though a significant proportion of participants self-
reported as non-white and non-British. Fifth, the lack of homogenous sample 
nationality risked leading to increased error measurements due to the self-report 
measures all being written in English; however, participants’ ratings of their language 
abilities suggested that very few lacked confidence in reading or writing in English. 
Sixth, this study recruited a convenience sample and potential confounders such 
as socio-economic status and education were not controlled for. Seventh, the 
psychometric properties of the MaPS have, to date, not been extensively tested in 
empirical studies. This requires the acknowledgement that the use of the MaPS in this 
study potentially weakens its findings. Finally, an eighth limitation could lie in in the 
similarities between the IDP and the PMP factor of the MaPS: i.e., are they measuring 
the same construct? We argue that they are not. IDP measures the frequency of IP 
behaviour whilst the PMP factor of the MaPS assesses the strength of positive meta-
beliefs about procrastination. Indeed, whilst these two variables were significantly 
associated, this was found only to be a moderate correlation (r = .35), suggesting that 
these are related, but different, constructs. 
Conclusions 
This study’s results are attenuated by several limitations, but we suggest that this paper 
presents significant evidence that describes a novel and potentially clinically relevant 
metacognitive model of procrastination from which new treatments, based on MCT, 
could be developed. We argue that problematic procrastination is a harmful behaviour 
that, not only deleteriously affects students’ academic performance, but also reduces the 
productivity of those in employment. It prevents individuals from achieving their full 
potential, negatively impacts on their mental health, and is sometimes harmful to their 
interpersonal relationships. Research has suggested that it affects a significant number 
of people and therefore an effective treatment could be widely beneficial, both on 
individual and societal levels. However, to justify such optimistic speculations, further 
research is needed to test the validity of the metacognitive model of procrastination that 
we have presented. For example, it may be of interest to test the model in samples of 
individuals with a primary clinical diagnosis that often incorporates procrastination as 
part of its presentation, such as addictive disorders. Fundamentally, however, the 
accuracy and robustness of our model will depend on research that tests whether 
modifications of the specified metacognitions, as well as improvements in selective 
attention, alters levels of UP. This might be achieved by conducting a pilot study that 
uses interventions derived from the model presented in this paper to disrupt the here 
within implicated maintaining factors of procrastination. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Author BAF receives salary support from the National Institute for Health Research 
(NIHR) Mental Health Biomedical Research Centre and Dementia Research Unit at 
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and King’s College London. The 
views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the NHS, the 
NIHR or the Department of Health. 
Author BAF would also like to acknowledge the support of Emma Milam and Sarah 
Thacker in the writing of this paper. 
 
References 
Association, A. P. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(Fifth ed.): American Psychiatric Association. 
Baumeister, R. F., & Heatherton, T. F. (1996). Self-regulation failure: An overview. 
Psychological inquiry, 7(1), 1-15.  
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1994). Losing control: How and 
why people fail at self-regulation: Academic Press. 
Baumeister, R. F., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (2000). Ego depletion: A resource 
model of volition, self-regulation, and controlled processing. Social cognition, 
18(2), 130.  
Berenbaum, H., Bredemeier, K., Thompson, R. J., & Boden, M. T. (2012). Worry, 
anhedonic depression, and emotional styles. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
36(1), 72-80.  
Birnbaum, M. H. (2004). Human research and data collection via the Internet. 
Psychology, 55(1), 803.  
Cartwright-Hatton, S., & Wells, A. (1997). Beliefs about Worry and Intrusions: The 
Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire and its Correlates. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 11(3), 279-296. doi: 10.1016/S0887-6185(97)00011-X 
Choi, J. N., & Moran, S. V. (2009). Why not procrastinate? Development and 
validation of a new active procrastination scale. J Soc Psychol, 149(2), 195-
211. doi: 10.3200/SOCP.149.2.195-212 
Chu, A. H., & Choi, J. N. (2005). Rethinking procrastination: positive effects of 
"active" procrastination behavior on attitudes and performance. J Soc Psychol, 
145(3), 245-264. doi: 10.3200/SOCP.145.3.245-264 
Ellis, A., & Knaus, W. J. (1977). Overcoming procrastination: Or how to think and 
act rationally in spite of life's inevitable hassles: Institute for Rational Living. 
Fernie, B. A., Bharucha, Z., Nikcevic, A. V., & Spada, M. M. (2016). The 
Unintentional Procrastination Scale. Journal of Rational-Emotive & 
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy.  
Fernie, B. A., McKenzie, A.-M., Nikčević, A. V., Caselli, G., & Spada, M. M. (2015). 
The Contribution of Metacognitions and Attentional Control to Decisional 
Procrastination. Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 
1-13.  
Fernie, B. A., & Spada, M. M. (2008). Metacognitions about procrastination: A 
preliminary investigation. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 36(03), 
359-364.  
Fernie, B. A., Spada, M. M., Nikčević, A. V., Georgiou, G. A., & Moneta, G. B. 
(2009). Metacognitive Beliefs About Procrastination: Development and 
Concurrent Validity of a Self-Report Questionnaire. Journal of Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 23(4), 283-293. doi: 10.1891/0889-8391.23.4.283 
Ferrari, J. R. (1994). Dysfunctional procrastination and its relationship with self-
esteem, interpersonal dependency, and self-defeating behaviors. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 17(5), 673-679.  
Ferrari, J. R., & Emmons, R. A. (1995). Methods of procrastination and their relation 
to self-control and self-reinforcement: An exploratory study. Journal of Social 
Behavior and Personality, 10(1), 135.  
Ferrari, J. R., Johnson, J. L., & McCown, W. G. (1995). Procrastination Research: 
Springer. 
Harriott, J., & Ferrari, J. R. (1996). Prevalence of procrastination among samples of 
adults. Psychological Reports, 78(2), 611-616.  
Haycock, L. A., McCarthy, P., & Skay, C. L. (1998). Procrastination in college 
students: The role of self‐efficacy and anxiety. Journal of Counseling & 
Development, 76(3), 317-324.  
Hofmann, W., Schmeichel, B. J., & Baddeley, A. D. (2012). Executive functions and 
self-regulation. Trends Cogn Sci, 16(3), 174-180. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2012.01.006 
Karas, D., & Spada, M. M. (2009). Brief cognitive-behavioural coaching for 
procrastination: A case series. Coaching: An International Journal of Theory, 
Research and Practice, 2(1), 44-53.  
Kroenke, K., Spitzer, R. L., & Williams, J. B. (2001). The PHQ-9: validity of a brief 
depression severity measure. J Gen Intern Med, 16(9), 606-613.  
Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited 
resources: Does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychol Bull, 126(2), 247.  
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Responses to depression and their effects on the duration 
of depressive episodes. J Abnorm Psychol, 100(4), 569-582. doi: 
10.1037/0021-843x.100.4.569 
Normann, N., van Emmerik, A. A., & Morina, N. (2014). The efficacy of 
metacognitive therapy for anxiety and depression: a meta-analytic review. 
Depress Anxiety, 31(5), 402-411. doi: 10.1002/da.22273 
Organization, W. H. (2004). International statistical classification of diseases and 
health related problems (The) ICD-10. World Health Organization.    
Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2009). A prospective test of the clinical metacognitive 
model of rumination and depression. International Journal of Cognitive 
Therapy, 2(2), 123-131.  
R-Studio. (2012). R Studio: integrated development environment for R: Version 0.97. 
Rosseel, Y. (2012). lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. Journal 
of Statistical Software, 48(2), 1-36.  
Rozental, A., Forsström, D., Nilsson, S., Rizzo, A., & Carlbring, P. (2014). Group 
versus Internet-based cognitive-behavioral therapy for procrastination: Study 
protocol for a randomized controlled trial. Internet Interventions, 1(2), 84-89. 
doi: 10.1016/j.invent.2014.05.005 
Shoham-Salomon, V., Avner, R., & Neeman, R. (1989). You're changed if you do and 
changed if you don't: Mechanisms underlying paradoxical interventions. 
Journal of consulting and clinical psychology, 57(5), 590.  
Solomon, L. J., & Rothblum, E. D. (1984). Academic Procrastination - Frequency and 
Cognitive-Behavioral Correlates. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 31(4), 
503-509. doi: Doi 10.1037//0022-0167.31.4.503 
Spada, M. M., Hiou, K., & Nikcevic, A. V. (2006). Metacognitions, Emotions, and 
Procrastination. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 20(3), 319-326. doi: 
10.1891/jcop.20.3.319 
Steel, P., & König, C. J. (2006). Integrating theories of motivation. Academy of 
Management Review, 31(4), 889-913.  
Stöber, J., & Joormann, J. (2001). Worry, procrastination, and perfectionism: 
Differentiating amount of worry, pathological worry, anxiety, and depression. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 25(1), 49-60.  
Toker, B., & Avci, R. (2015). Effect of Cognitive-Behavioral-Theory-based Skill 
Training on Academic Procrastination Behaviors of University Students. 
Educational Sciences: Theory & Practice, 5, 1157-1168.  
Tuckman, B., & Sexton, T. (1989). Effects of relative feedback in overcoming 
procrastination on academic tasks. Paper presented at the meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA. 
Wang, S., Zhou, Y., Yu, S., Ran, L.-W., Liu, X.-P., & Chen, Y.-F. (2015). 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and Cognitive–Behavioral Therapy as 
Treatments for Academic Procrastination A Randomized Controlled Group 
Session. Research on Social Work Practice, 1049731515577890.  
Wells, A. (2007). The attention training technique: Theory, effects, and a 
metacognitive hypothesis on auditory hallucinations. Cognitive and 
Behavioral Practice, 14(2), 134-138.  
Wells, A. (2011). Metacognitive therapy for anxiety and depression: Guilford press. 
Wells, A., & Cartwright-Hatton, S. (2004). A short form of the metacognitions 
questionnaire: properties of the MCQ-30. Behav Res Ther, 42(4), 385-396. 
doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00147-5 
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and emotion: A clinical perspective: 
Psychology Press. 
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1996). Modelling cognition in emotional disorder: The S-
REF model. Behav Res Ther, 34(11), 881-888.  
Wells, A., White, J., & Carter, K. (1997). Attention training: Effects on anxiety and 
beliefs in panic and social phobia. Clin Psychol Psychother, 4(4), 226-232.  
Table 1: Means, SDs, ranges, and Cronbach’s alphas for all experimental variables and 
a non-parametric correlation matrix 
  Mean SD Range 
Cronbach's 
alpha 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Age 30.89 12.65 18-72 N/A -.09 -.28** -.18** -.17** -.13* -.19** 
2. IDP 15.59 5.2 4-28 0.66 
 
.15** .16** .35** -.06 .13* 
3.PHQ-9 15.42 5.8 9-35 0.88 
  
.48** .22** .44** .43** 
4. UPS 14.59 5.16 6-24 0.88 
   
.21** .46** .50** 
5.PMP 14.30 4.41 8-32 0.77 
    
-.08 .16** 
6. NMP 20.11 6.74 8-32 0.90 
     
.60** 
7. CAS 
mean 
.0013 0.83 
-1.43-
1.78 
N/A 
      
Note. IDP = Intentional Decision to Procrastinate; PHQ-9 = Patient Health 
Questionnaire 9; UPS = Unintentional Procrastination Scale; PMP = Positive 
Metacognitions about Procrastination; NMP = Negative Metacognitions about 
Procrastination; CAS mean = Cognitive Attentional Syndrome mean z-score; n=305 to 
n=400;  
* = p < .05;  
** = p < .01. 
Table 2: Six-step hierarchical regression analysis with UPS as the outcome variable 
 
 
     95% Confidence 
Interval 
Predictor R
2
 Adjusted 
R
2
 
R
2
 
Change 
B SE β LL UL 
Step 1         
 Age    -0.69 0.02 -.17** -.11 -.02 
  .03** .03** .03**      
Step 2         
 Age    -0.08 0.02 -.19** -0.12 -0.03 
 EtPT    1.13 0.65 .10 -0.14 2.41 
   .04** .03** .01      
Step 3         
 Age    -0.03 0.02 -.06 -0.07 0.02 
 EtPT    0.37 0.58 .03 -0.77 1.51 
 PHQ-9    0.42 0.05 .47** 0.33 0.51 
  .24** .24** .21**      
Step 4         
 Age    -0.03 0.02 -.06 -0.07 0.02 
 EtPT    0.43 0.58 .04 -0.71 1.57 
 PHQ-9    0.41 0.05 .46** 0.32 0.50 
 IDP    0.10 0.05 .10 -0.00 0.20 
  .25** .24** .01      
Step 5         
 Age    -0.02 0.02 -.04 -0.06 0.02 
 EtPT    0.03 0.54 .00 -1.03 1.09 
 PHQ-9    0.25 0.05 .28** 0.51 0.34 
 IDP    0.10 0.05 .10 -0.00 0.19 
 PMP    0.17 0.06 .14** 0.05 0.29 
 NMP    0.28 0.04 .37** 0.20 0.36 
  .36** .35** .11**      
Step 6         
 Age    -0.01 0.02 -.03 0.05 0.03 
 EtPT    -0.08 0.53 -.01 -1.13 0.97 
 PHQ-9    0.23 0.05 .26** 0.14 0.33 
 IDP    0.07 0.05 .07 -0.03 0.17 
 PMP    0.14 0.06 .12* 0.02 0.26 
 NMP    0.20 0.05 .26** 0.11 0.29 
 CAS mean    1.17 0.37 .19** 0.44 1.91 
  .38** .37** .02**      
Note. UPS = Unintentional Procrastination Scale; EtPT = Exposure to Psychological 
Therapy; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire 9; IDP = Intentional Decision to 
Procrastinate; PMP = Positive Metacognitions about Procrastination; NMP = Negative 
Metacognitions about Procrastination; CAS mean = Cognitive Attentional Syndrome 
mean z-score; n = 305;  
* = p < .05;  
** = p < .01. 
Figure 1: Standardized path coefficients for the metacognitive model of procrastination. 
Note. PMP = Positive Metacognitions about Procrastination; IDP = Intentional Decision 
to Procrastinate; CAS = Cognitive Attentional Syndrome mean z-score; NMP = 
Negative Metacognitions about Procrastination; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire 
9; UPS = Unintentional Procrastination Scale; n = 305; ** = p <.001. 
 
 
 
 
Highlights 
 Procrastination is highly prevalent in students and adults. 
 Procrastination negatively impacts a wide range of psychosocial domains. 
 Unintentional procrastination is strongly associated with psychopathology. 
 A metacognitive model explains disparate findings from the extant literature. 
 This new model suggests new treatments for unintentional procrastination. 
 
